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Optimal Committee Performance: Size versus Diversity

Stone, Peter and Kagotani, Koji (2013) Optimal Committee Performance: Size versus Diversity. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), together with a large and growing literature of ancillary results, suggests two conclusions. First, large committees outperform small
committees, other things equal. Second, heterogeneous committees can, under the right circumstances, outperform homogeneous ones, again other things equal. But this
literature has done little to bring these two conclusions together. This paper employs simulations to compare the respective contributions of size and difference to optimal
committee performance. It demonstrates that the contributions depend dramatically upon bias. In the presence of low bias, committee composition matters little. In the presence of high bias, it can matter a great deal; optimal committee performance, however, does not vary dramatically between low- and high-bias committees.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Stone, Peterpstone@tcd.ie
Kagotani, Kojikagotank@tcd.ie
Keywords: Condorcet Jury Theorem, Collective Decision-Making, Diversity, Simulations
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User: Dr. Peter Stone
Date Deposited: 02 Jul 2013 05:02
Last Modified: 02 Jul 2013 05:02
Item ID: 9857
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Date: 1 July 2013
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9857

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