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Inconsistency and Scientific Realism

Saatsi, Juha (2013) Inconsistency and Scientific Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (1987) and Smith (1988), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Saatsi, JuhaJ.T.Saatsi@leeds.ac.uk
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Synthese
Keywords: Inconsistency; Realism
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Juha Saatsi
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2013 14:09
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2013 14:09
Item ID: 9568
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2013
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9568

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