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schrenk, markus (2010) ANTIDOTES FOR DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM. The Metaphysics of Powers. Their Grounding and their Manifestations.. pp. 169-181.


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Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively analyse dispositional predicates.
In the light of these anti-Humean successes, and in combination with ideas surrounding metaphysical necessity put forward by Kripke and Putnam, some dispositionalists felt encouraged to propose a strong anti-Humean view under the name of “Dispositional Essentialism”.
In this paper, I show that, ironically, the counterexamples dispositionalists have used against the Humean reductive analysis of dispositional predicates also prove to be problems for a strong form of dispositional essentialism that assimilates dispositionality and metaphysical necessity.
Help comes from an unlike ally—Carnapian reductions sentences—but the alliance is not unproblematic.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Keywords: Carnap, dispositions, laws, necessity
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Depositing User: Prof. Markus Schrenk
Date Deposited: 31 Dec 2011 17:48
Last Modified: 31 Dec 2011 17:48
Item ID: 8980
Journal or Publication Title: The Metaphysics of Powers. Their Grounding and their Manifestations.
Publisher: Routledge
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Date: 2010
Page Range: pp. 169-181

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