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The Common Cause Principle. Explanation via Screening off.

Wronski, Leszek (2010) The Common Cause Principle. Explanation via Screening off. [Preprint]

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My Ph.D. dissertation written under the supervision of Prof. Tomasz Placek at the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.

In one of its most basic and informal shapes, the principle of the common cause states that any surprising correlation between two factors which are believed not to directly influence one another is due to their (possibly hidden) common cause. Here we will be concerned with a version od this idea which possesses a purely probabilistic formulation. It was introduced, in the form of a general principle, by Hans Reichenbach in his posthumously published book "The Direction of Time". The central notion of the principle in Reichenbach's formulation, and of the current essay, is that of screening off: two correlated events are screened off by a third event if conditioning on the third event makes them probabilistically independent. Reichenbach's principle marks also the beginning of a new field of philosophy: namely, that of ``probabilistic causality''.

For the most part, the current essay can be seen as an effort at checking how far one can go with the purely statistical notions revolving around Reichenbach's idea of common cause. In short, the answer is ``surprisingly far''; in some classes of probability spaces all correlations between ``interesting'' (e.g. ``logically independent'', this will be formally defined in chapter 6) events possess explanations of such sort. However, this fact lends itself to opposing interpretations; more on that in the conclusion. Chapters 6 and 7 contain mathematical results concerning these issues. The screening-off condition requires an equality of a probabilistic nature to hold; chapter 8 is a short discussion of slightly weakened versions of the condition, which hold if the sides of the above mentioned equality differ to a small degree.

In chapter 2, after some mathematical preliminaries, we study the various formulations of the principle which might be said to stem from the original idea of Reichenbach. We also examine a few of the most salient counterarguments, which undermine at least some of the formulations. Chapter 3 is of a formal nature, dealing with various probabilistic notions which can be thought of as generalizations of Reichenbach's concept of common cause. The next chapter concerns the relationship between the idea of common causal explanation and the Bell inequalities. In chapter 5 we briefly present the form of Reichenbach's principle which can be found in the field of representing causal structures by means of directed acyclic graphs.

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Item Type: Preprint
Keywords: common cause, Reichenbach, probability, probabilistic causality, Bell inequalities
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Leszek Wronski
Date Deposited: 13 Dec 2011 12:57
Last Modified: 13 Dec 2011 12:57
Item ID: 8946
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 10 September 2010

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