PhilSci Archive

A Historical Shift in Philosophy of Science

Lim, Nural (2024) A Historical Shift in Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
A Historical Shift in Philosophy of Science.pdf

Download (243kB) | Preview

Abstract

Following a history of empiricism from the Vienna Circle to Quine, in this paper I will show that a remarkable turn, which led empiricism to pragmatism, is witnessed. The Vienna Circle was faced with the crisis of skepticism, and in order to find an intersubjective ground for empirical knowledge, some logical positivists appealed to protocol sentences. However, there was not a consensus among the Vienna Circle’s figures about the role and status of these sentences; protocol sentences were supposed, at least to some accounts, to fill the gap between empirical theories and the physical real world. It will show such attempts were not successful. Having argued against fundamental aspects of the Vienna Circle, Quine admitted that we cannot find epistemologically objective platform to build an empirical theory which represents the reality, rather we need to appeal to pragmatical criteria to circumvent skeptical concerns.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lim, Nuralnurulilm@yahoo.com
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Depositing User: Dr Nural Lim
Date Deposited: 01 Feb 2024 01:49
Last Modified: 01 Feb 2024 01:49
Item ID: 23028
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Date: 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23028

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item