PhilSci Archive

Scientific Representation

Nguyen, James and Frigg, Roman (2022) Scientific Representation. ISSN 9781009003575

[img]
Preview
Text
Scientific Representation.pdf

Download (128kB) | Preview

Abstract

This Element presents a philosophical exploration of the notion of scientific representation. It does so by focussing on an important class of scientific representations, namely scientific models. Models are important in the scientific process because scientists can study a model to discover features of reality. But what does it mean for something to represent something else? This is the question we discuss in this book. We begin by disentangling different aspects of the problem of representation and then discuss the dominant accounts in the philosophical literature: the resemblance view and inferentialism. We find them both wanting and submit that our own preferred option, the so-called DEKI account, not only eschews the problems that beset these conceptions, but further provides a comprehensive answer to the question of how scientific representation works. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Nguyen, Jamesjames.nguyen@philosophy.su.se
Frigg, Romanr.p.frigg@lse.ac.uk
Keywords: representation, scientific modelling, epistemology of science, model-world relation, DEKI
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Roman Frigg
Date Deposited: 08 Jan 2024 13:11
Last Modified: 08 Jan 2024 13:11
Item ID: 22932
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Elements)
Official URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/scientific...
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2022
ISSN: 9781009003575
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22932

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item