PhilSci Archive

How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values v. Polarization and Marginalization

Le Bihan, Soazig (2023) How to Not Secure Public Trust in Science: Representative Values v. Polarization and Marginalization. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248

[img]
Preview
Text
202304-DemocraticValues-FINAL.pdf

Download (237kB) | Preview

Abstract

The demise of the value-free ideal constitutes a threat to public trust in science. One proposal is that whenever making value judgments, scientists rely only on democratic values. Since the influence of democratic values on scientific claims and recommendations is legitimate, public trust in science is warranted. I challenge this proposal. Appealing to democratic values will not suffice to secure trust because of at least two obstacles: polarization and marginalization.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Le Bihan, Soazig
Keywords: science and values; value-free ideal; democratic values; conservation; public trust
Subjects: ٠ Out of Print ٠
Depositing User: Dr. Soazig Le Bihan
Date Deposited: 22 Dec 2023 16:16
Last Modified: 22 Dec 2023 16:16
Item ID: 22888
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Official URL: DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.119
Subjects: ٠ Out of Print ٠
Date: 21 September 2023
ISSN: 0031-8248
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22888

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item