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A Framework for Inductive Reasoning in Model-Based Science

Barroso Rojo, Milagros Maribel (2023) A Framework for Inductive Reasoning in Model-Based Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper argues that the linguistic approach to analyzing induction, according to which induction is a type of inference or argument composed of statements or propositions, is unsuitable to account for scientific reasoning. Consequently, a novel approach to induction in model-based science is suggested. First, in order to show their adherence to the linguistic treatment of induction, two strategies are reviewed: (i) Carnap and Reichenbach’s attempts to justify induction and (ii) Norton’s recent material theory of induction. Second, three reasons are provided to support the claim that the linguistic treatment of induction is insufficient in accounting for model-based reasoning in science. Finally, a framework focused on models—rather than statements or propositions—is suggested to address induction in science. William Whewell’s theory of induction is briefly outlined as an example of a non-propositional treatment of induction that is consistent with model-based scientific practice.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Barroso Rojo, Milagros Maribelmbarroso@alumnos.uahurtado.cl
Keywords: Induction, inductive reasoning, scientific inference, material theory of induction, models, Whewell’s induction
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Ms Milagros Maribel Barroso Rojo
Date Deposited: 22 Dec 2023 16:19
Last Modified: 22 Dec 2023 16:19
Item ID: 22886
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 28 December 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22886

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