PhilSci Archive

The case of early Copernicanism: Epistemic luck vs. predictivist vindication

Vincenzo, Crupi (2023) The case of early Copernicanism: Epistemic luck vs. predictivist vindication. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
CRUPI_CopernicusNov2023NEWNEW.pdf

Download (279kB) | Preview

Abstract

From Copernicus himself up to Kepler and Galilei, Copernicans have been "right for the wrong reasons" (Finocchiaro 2010), because there were no epistemically compelling reasons objectively favoring the Copernican position at that stage – a good deal of research in the history and philosophy of science has converged on this claim. The situation of early Copernicans would then be regarded as one of "epistemic luck". Imre Lakatos and Elie Zahar (1975) have featured in one relatively rare contemporary episode of sustained opposition to the epistemic luck thesis about early Copernicanism. Although known and appreciated in certain philosophical circles, it is fair to say that Lakatos and Zahar's predictivist vindication has remained quite unsuccessful. The goal of this paper is to revive it in updated form. My analysis will support two general claims. First and foremost, previous limitations of a predictivist account of the Copernican controversy can be amended to counter the epistemic luck thesis. And second, consideration of the vindication thesis highlights certain important but neglected elements of the historical narrative.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vincenzo, Crupivincenzo.crupi@unito.it
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Vincenzo Crupi
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2023 02:50
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2023 02:50
Item ID: 22821
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22821

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item