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Functionalism Fit for Physics

Knox, Eleanor and Wallace, David (2023) Functionalism Fit for Physics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We put the recent flurry of interest in functionalism in philosophy of physics into context by considering functionalism's roots in philosophy of mind. There we identify two types of functionalism, which we call `causal-role' and `constitutive' functionalism: the former is a defeasible reductive hypothesis, while the latter, when true, is analytically so, and is not itself reductive. We argue through case studies that it is the constitutive notion of functionalism that is the better fit to physics.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Knox, Eleanoreleanor.knox@kcl.ac.uk
Wallace, David
Keywords: Functionalism, Lewis, Dennett
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Condensed Matter
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User: Dr Eleanor Knox
Date Deposited: 14 Oct 2023 04:14
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2023 04:14
Item ID: 22655
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Condensed Matter
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date: 5 October 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22655

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