PhilSci Archive

A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness

List, Christian (2023) A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
Quadrilemma28Sep2023.pdf

Download (252kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this discussion paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims – namely, “first-person realism”, “non-solipsism”, “non-fragmentation”, and “one world” – but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a “quadrilemma”. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
List, Christian
Keywords: Consciousness, Subjectivity, Objectivity, Quadrilemma, Facts, First-person realism, Non-solipsism, Non-fragmentation, One world versus many worlds, Meta-problem of consciousness
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Christian List
Date Deposited: 28 Sep 2023 14:37
Last Modified: 28 Sep 2023 14:37
Item ID: 22582
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 28 September 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22582

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item