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Existential Quantifiers in the contemporary philosophy

Erfanifar, T (2022) Existential Quantifiers in the contemporary philosophy. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper explores different perspectives on the predicative nature of “existence” in contemporary logic and philosophy. The text encompasses the views of various philosophers, including Quine, Leśniewski, Strawson, and Grayling. The discussions revolve around the question of whether “existence” can be considered a logical predicate
or if it should be treated differently. Quine argues against treating “existence” as a predicate, while Leśniewski proposes an unlimited interpretation of predicates that allows for the logical inclusion of “existence.” Strawson presents arguments both in favor of and against the predicative nature of “existence,” while Grayling criticizes Strawson’s proposal, pointing out its inconsistency with his earlier views. The paper shed light on the tension between logic and metaphysics, the limitations of artificial languages in capturing everyday meanings, and the interplay between logical formulation and the understanding of existence. Overall, the paper provides insights into the complex relationship between language, logic, and metaphysics in the philosophical discourse surrounding the concept of “existence.”


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
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Erfanifar, T
Keywords: Existence Logic Existential Quantifier
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Depositing User: Taban T.E Erfanifar
Date Deposited: 23 Jul 2023 16:06
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2023 16:06
Item ID: 22332
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Date: 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22332

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