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Scientific Models and Thought Experiments: Same Same but Different

El Skaf, Rawad and Stuart, Michael T. (2023) Scientific Models and Thought Experiments: Same Same but Different. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The philosophical literature on models and thought experiments have been developing exponentially and independently for decades. This independence is surprising, given how similar models and thought experiments are. They each have “lives of their own,”—they sit between theory and experience, are important for both pedagogy and cutting-edge science, galvanize conceptual changes and paradigm shifts, and involve considering imaginary scenarios and working out what happens. Recently, philosophers have begun to highlight these similarities. This entry aims at taking the idea further, by trying to systematically identify places where insights from one body of literature can be taken up in the other. Important differences will also be highlighted along the way.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
El Skaf, Rawadrawadskaff@gmail.com0000-0002-5883-1072
Stuart, Michael T.mike.stuart.post@gmail.com0000-0002-4165-2641
Additional Information: Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Scientific Modeling. London, Routledge.
Keywords: thought experiments; models; representation; ontology; epistemology; surrogative reasoning; imagination
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Michael T. Stuart
Date Deposited: 02 Jul 2023 13:13
Last Modified: 02 Jul 2023 13:13
Item ID: 22272
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 1 July 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22272

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