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Accuracy-first epistemology and scientific progress

Lewis, Peter J. and Fallis, Don and Fitelson, Branden (2022) Accuracy-first epistemology and scientific progress. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The accuracy-first program attempts to ground epistemology in the norm that one’s beliefs should be as accurate as possible, where accuracy is measured using a scoring rule. We argue that considerations of scientific progress suggest that such a monism about epistemic value is untenable. In particular, we argue that counterexamples to the standard scoring rules are ubiquitous in the history of science, and hence that these scoring rules cannot be regarded as a precisification of our intuitive concept of epistemic value.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lewis, Peter J.peter.j.lewis@dartmouth.edu
Fallis, Dond.fallis@northeastern.edu
Fitelson, Brandenb.fitelson@northeastern.edu
Keywords: Accuracy, scoring rules, epistemic value, scientific progress
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Peter J. Lewis
Date Deposited: 11 May 2023 13:03
Last Modified: 11 May 2023 13:03
Item ID: 22090
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date: 26 August 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22090

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