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The ontological burden of mathematics and scientific realism

Alemañ-Berenguer, Rafael-Andrés (2023) The ontological burden of mathematics and scientific realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Mathematical modelling of nature, due to its accuracy and universality, plays
a key role in the scientific inquiry of the world. So important its function is that some
authors have defended the existence of an ontological burden in the mathematical
formalism used by scientists. According to this opinion, the appeal to certain formalism
would entail an implicit commitment to the type of entities that populate the material
world. In this paper, the aforementioned thesis will be analysed, as well as other versions
of mathematical Platonism, with the conclusion that there are no reasons to support it and
that, therefore, it does not pose a threat to a realistic metaphysics in any of its modalities,
such as structural realism.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Alemañ-Berenguer, Rafael-Andrésraalbe.autor@gmail.com0000-0002-3612-8167
Keywords: ontology, realism, mathematical structure, theoretical representation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr Rafael-Andrés Alemañ-Berenguer
Date Deposited: 24 Apr 2023 12:37
Last Modified: 24 Apr 2023 12:37
Item ID: 22013
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22013

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