PhilSci Archive

On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy

Dyck, Keith (2022) On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy.pdf

Download (208kB) | Preview

Abstract

Colin Howson (2000) contends that the No-Miracles argument fails as an argument in support of scientific realism because it commits the base-rate fallacy. In response, Stathis Psillos (2009) has defended the argument by appealing to cases that involve conditional probabilities but where base-rate information can properly be ignored. Through an examination of these cases, I show that Psillos’s defense of the No- Miracles argument is inadequate and that the prospects for a purely probabilistic formulation of the argument are dim. I end by considering whether interpreting the argument as an inference to the best explanation might better serve the scientific realist, concluding that such an approach would limit both the argument’s audience and the realist’s ability to effectively counter the Pessimistic Induction.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dyck, Keithkeithdyck@ucsb.edu
Keywords: No-Miracles, Scientific Realism, Base-Rate Fallacy
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Keith Dyck
Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2023 22:20
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2023 22:20
Item ID: 21960
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 16 March 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21960

Available Versions of this Item

  • On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy. (deposited 01 Apr 2023 22:20) [Currently Displayed]

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item