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Constructive Verification, Empirical Induction, and Falibilist Deduction: A Threefold Contrast

Stern, Julio Michael (2011) Constructive Verification, Empirical Induction, and Falibilist Deduction: A Threefold Contrast. Information, 2 (4). pp. 635-650. ISSN 2078-2489

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Abstract

This article explores some open questions related to the problem of verification of theories in the context of empirical sciences by contrasting three epistemological frameworks. Each of these epistemological frameworks is based on a corresponding central metaphor, namely: (a) Neo empiricism and the gambling metaphor; (b) Popperian falsificationism and the scientific tribunal metaphor; (c) Cognitive constructivism and the object as eigen-solution metaphor. Each of one of these epistemological frameworks has also historically co-evolved with a certain statistical theory and method for testing scientific hypotheses, respectively: (a) Decision theoretic Bayesian statistics and Bayes factors; (b) Frequentist statistics and p-values; (c) Constructive Bayesian statistics and e-values. This article examines with special care the Zero Probability Paradox (ZPP), related to the verification of sharp or precise hypotheses. Finally, this article makes some remarks on Lakatos' view of mathematics as a quasi-empirical science.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Stern, Julio Michael0000-0003-2720-3871
Keywords: Bayesian statistics; cognitive constructivism; eigen-solutions; Imre Lakatos; neo-empiricism; Popperian falsificationism; sharp hypotheses; zero probability paradox.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Prof. Julio Michael Stern
Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2023 18:24
Last Modified: 26 Mar 2023 18:24
Item ID: 21923
Journal or Publication Title: Information
Official URL: http://doi.org/10.3390/info2040635
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.3390/info2040635
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 2011
Page Range: pp. 635-650
Volume: 2
Number: 4
ISSN: 2078-2489
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21923

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