PhilSci Archive

The Hole Argument and Beyond: Part I: The Story so Far

Gomes, Henrique and Butterfield, Jeremy (2023) The Hole Argument and Beyond: Part I: The Story so Far. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
HoleOne_arxiv.pdf

Download (432kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this two-part paper, we review, and then develop, the assessment of the hole argument for general relativity. This first Part reviews the literature hitherto, focussing on the philosophical aspects. It also introduces two main ideas we will need in Part II: which will propose a framework for making comparisons of non-isomorphic spacetimes.

In Section 1 of this paper, we recall Einstein’s original argument. Section 2 recalls the argument's revival by philosophers in the 1980s and 1990s. This includes the first main idea we will need in Part II: namely, that two spacetime points in different possible situations are never strictly identical—they are merely counterparts.

In Section 3, we report---and rebut---more recent claims to “dissolve” the argument. Our rebuttal is based on the fact that in differential geometry, and its applications in physics such as general relativity, points are in some cases identified, or correspond with each other, between one context and another, by means other than isometry (or isomorphism). We call such a correspondence a “threading” of points. This is the second main idea we shall use in Part II.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gomes, Henriquegomes.ha@gmail.com0000-0002-9285-0090
Butterfield, Jeremyjb56@cam.ac.uk0000-0002-0215-5802
Additional Information: Forthcoming in the Journal of Physics: Proceedings of the DICE Conference, Castiglioncello, Italy, September 2022
Keywords: the hole argument, substantivalism, spacetime points as counterparts, identifying points other than by isomorphism
Subjects: General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User: Jeremy Butterfield
Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2023 15:59
Last Modified: 26 Mar 2023 15:59
Item ID: 21911
Subjects: General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date: March 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21911

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item