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Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animals

Danón, Laura (2022) Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animals. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 37 (3). pp. 309-330. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different animals may recombine their concepts. More specifically, I propose to differentiate between a) narrow causal-counterfactual recombination; b) broad causal-counterfactual recombination; c) lean spontaneous recombination; d) robust spontaneous recombination. Afterwards, I focus on how these distinctions relate to several previous philosophical ideas on the representational capacities of non-human animals. I also provide several empirical examples suggesting that some animals display one or another of these four ways of recombining concepts, at least in some contexts.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Danón, Lauraldanon@unc.edu.ar0000-0003-2618-8948
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Non-human animals, concepts, conceptual recombination, animal minds
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2023 16:46
Last Modified: 06 Feb 2023 16:46
Item ID: 21729
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23638
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Date: September 2022
Page Range: pp. 309-330
Volume: 37
Number: 3
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21729

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