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Why Subjectivism?

de Canson, Chloé (2022) Why Subjectivism? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In response to two trenchant objections, radical subjective Bayesianism has been widely rejected. In this paper, I seek, if not to rehabilitate subjectivism, at least to show its critic what is attractive about the position. I argue that what is at stake in the subjectivism/anti-subjectivism debate is not, as is commonly thought, which norms of rationality are true, but rather, the conception of rationality that we adopt: there is an alternative approach to the widespread telic approach to rationality, which I call the poric approach, on which subjectivism is an attractive position. I then argue that the poric approach—and therefore subjectivism—cannot be easily dismissed.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
de Canson, Chloé
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Chloé de Canson
Date Deposited: 05 Dec 2022 14:27
Last Modified: 05 Dec 2022 14:27
Item ID: 21513
Official URL: https://philpapers.org/archive/CANWS.pdf
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21513

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