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Genericity and Inductive Inference

Schiller, Henry Ian (2022) Genericity and Inductive Inference. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We can be justified in acting on the basis of evidence confirming a generalization. I argue that such evidence supports belief in non-quantificational – or generic – generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of confirmation. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of a reasoning instinct that is typically (but not always) correct, and allows us to approximate the predictions that formal epistemology would make.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Schiller, Henry Ianh.i.schiller@sheffield.ac.uk
Keywords: generics; inductive inference; Hume
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Depositing User: Dr Henry Ian Schiller
Date Deposited: 07 Nov 2022 14:44
Last Modified: 07 Nov 2022 14:44
Item ID: 21366
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Date: 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21366

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