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Collective epistemic vice in science: Lessons from the credibility crisis

Uygun Tunc, Duygu and Pritchard, Duncan (2022) Collective epistemic vice in science: Lessons from the credibility crisis. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We investigate the explanatory role of epistemic virtue in accounting for the success (or failure) of science as a social institution that is characterized by predominantly epistemic ends. Several structural explanations of the epistemic success of science that commonly rule out virtue attributions to scientists are explored in reference to a case of collective epistemic vice; namely, the credibility crisis in the social and behavioral sciences. These accounts underline the social structure of science as the chief explanatory factor in its collective success, and endorse a common conclusion, namely that individual virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for science to be successful. While acknowledging that divergent motivations and behaviors might also serve the collective goals of science, our analysis of the credibility crisis shows that the presence of a significant proportion of epistemically virtuous scientists in a scientific community is a necessary condition for collective epistemic success in a scientific community.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Uygun Tunc, Duyguduygu.uygun@outlook.com0000-0003-0148-0416
Pritchard, Duncan
Subjects: General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Duygu Uygun Tunc
Date Deposited: 01 Sep 2022 16:56
Last Modified: 01 Sep 2022 16:56
Item ID: 21120
Subjects: General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: August 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21120

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