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Is Philosophy Exceptional? A Corpus-Based, Quantitative Study

Mizrahi, Moti and Dickinson, Mike (2022) Is Philosophy Exceptional? A Corpus-Based, Quantitative Study. [Preprint]


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Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its methods (dis)continuous with science? More specifically, we test the following metaphilosophical hypotheses empirically: philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, and philosophical abductivism. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we searched through a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 435,703) to find patterns of argumentation. The results of our quantitative, corpus-based study suggest that deductive arguments are significantly more common than abductive arguments and inductive arguments in philosophical texts overall, but they are gradually and steadily giving way to non-deductive (i.e., inductive and abductive) arguments in academic philosophy.

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Item Type: Preprint
Dickinson, Mike
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Social Epistemology
Keywords: abductive argument, deductive argument, exceptionalism, indicator words, inductive argument, metaphilosophy, philosophical abductivism, philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, text analysis
Subjects: General Issues > Data
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited: 07 Aug 2022 03:43
Last Modified: 07 Aug 2022 03:43
Item ID: 21018
Subjects: General Issues > Data
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date: 4 August 2022

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