PhilSci Archive

Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central

Ongaro, Giulio and Hardman, Doug and Deschenaux, Ivan (2022) Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
Text
Ongaro2022_Article_WhyTheExtendedMindIsNothingSpe.pdf

Download (928kB) | Preview

Abstract

The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ongaro, Giuliog.ongaro@lse.ac.uk0000-0003-2782-0642
Hardman, Dougdihardman@bournemouth.ac.uk0000-0001-6717-2323
Deschenaux, Ivani.deschenaux@lse.ac.uk0000-0002-7737-6255
Keywords: Extended mind; collective intentionality; shared cognition; extended emotions; social ontology
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Action
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Dr. Giulio Ongaro
Date Deposited: 17 Jul 2022 06:31
Last Modified: 17 Jul 2022 06:31
Item ID: 20909
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09827-5
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Action
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 23 February 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20909

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item