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Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood

Nešić, Janko (2022) Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.

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Abstract

Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Nešić, Jankonesicjanko@gmail.com0000-0003-3897-5703
Keywords: Information, ontic structural realism, panpsychism, neutral monism, consciousness, self
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Dr. Janko Nešić
Date Deposited: 11 Jul 2022 15:22
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2022 15:22
Item ID: 20876
Journal or Publication Title: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 8 July 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20876

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