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Scepticism, Evidential Holism, and the Logic of Demonic Deception

Okasha, Samir (2022) Scepticism, Evidential Holism, and the Logic of Demonic Deception. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Sceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they �fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument:
underdetermination-based and closure-based. However, both sorts of argument, as usually formulated in the literature, fall foul of evidential holism, for they ignore the crucial role of background beliefs. An analogy with the philosophy of science makes this point explicit. This
leads to the question of whether it is possible to \holism proof" the sceptical arguments, and if so how.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Okasha, SamirSamir.Okasha@bristol.ac.uk
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Dr Samir Okasha
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2022 12:18
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2022 12:18
Item ID: 20869
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 9 July 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20869

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