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Securing the Objectivity of Relative Facts in the Quantum World

Healey, Richard (2022) Securing the Objectivity of Relative Facts in the Quantum World. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper compares and contrasts relational quantum mechanics (RQM) with a pragmatist view of quantum theory. I’ll first explain important points of agreement. Then I’ll point to two problems faced by RQM and sketch DP’s solutions to analogous problems. Since both RQM and DP have taken the Born rule to require relative facts I next say what these might be. This brings me to my main objection to RQM as originally conceived—that its ontology of relative facts is incompatible with scientific objectivity and undercuts the evidential base of quantum theory. In contrast DP’s relative facts have all the objectivity we need to accept quantum theory as scientific knowledge. But a very recent modification to RQM has successfully addressed my main objection, bringing the two views into even closer alignment.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Healey, Richardrichardahealey@gmail.com0000-0001-9329-2927
Additional Information: For publication in a special issue of Foundations of Physics on Relational Quantum Mechanics
Keywords: Relational quantum mechanics; pragmatist approach; scientific objectivity; relative fact; relativism; context of use; context of assessment; Wigner's friend.
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Richard Andrew Healey
Date Deposited: 06 Jul 2022 04:08
Last Modified: 06 Jul 2022 04:08
Item ID: 20846
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 5 July 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20846

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