PhilSci Archive

Concept Revision, Concept Application and the Role of Intuitions in Gettier Cases

Sękowski, Krzysztof (2022) Concept Revision, Concept Application and the Role of Intuitions in Gettier Cases. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
ConcRevConcApp_preprint.pdf

Download (406kB) | Preview

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to determine the role of intuitions in Gettier cases. Critics of the Method of Cases argue that arguments developed within this method contains a premise that is justified by its intuitiveness; they also argue that intuitions are unreliable source of evidence. By contrast, Max Deutsch argues that this critique is unsound since intuitions do not serve as evidence for premises. In Gettier cases, an intuitive premise is justified by other arguments called G-Grounds. I propose a different view on the role of intuition in Gettier cases. I introduce a distinction between concept-revision arguments and concept-application arguments. On the basis of this distinction and Craig’s and Spicer’s distinction between intuitions of intension and intuitions of extension, I show that (1) intuitions of extension do not serve as evidence for any G-Grounds; (2) intuitions of intension do play an evidential role for all G-Grounds, but (3) in the case of G-Grounds which are used as concept-application arguments, they are a poor source of evidence, while (4) in the case of G-Grounds used as concept-revision arguments, they could be a reliable source of evidence if they are intuitions of intension of a speaker immersed in philosophical discourse.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sękowski, Krzysztofk.sekowski@uw.edu.pl0000-0001-6547-9997
Keywords: intuition, method of cases, gettier cases, thought experiments, metaphilosophy
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Mr Krzysztof Sękowski
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2022 13:52
Last Modified: 21 Jun 2022 13:52
Item ID: 20774
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 8 June 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20774

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item