PhilSci Archive

On dispensability and indispensability

LeBrun, Alex (2022) On dispensability and indispensability. In: UNSPECIFIED.

[img]
Preview
Text
LeBrun.On-disp-and-indisp.pdf

Download (109kB) | Preview

Abstract

Many philosophers present dispensability or indispensability arguments that presuppose a specific conception of
dispensability. The present paper explores and critiques the reigning conception of dispensability. In particular, I argue that it entails that too many things are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This entailment is at odds with the purpose for which we seek a conception of dispensability. In light of my arguments, I present a positive proposal that radically shifts our understanding of how dispensability and indispensability arguments work. This new proposal demands a metaphysics of science that splits the difference between pure empiricism and pure rationalism.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
LeBrun, Alexlebrun@ucsb.edu
Keywords: indispensability, dispensability, mathematics, metaphysics
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Depositing User: Mr. Alex LeBrun
Date Deposited: 31 May 2022 02:29
Last Modified: 31 May 2022 02:29
Item ID: 20685
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Date: 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20685

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item