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On dispensability and indispensability

LeBrun, Alex (2022) On dispensability and indispensability. In: UNSPECIFIED.


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Many philosophers present dispensability or indispensability arguments that presuppose a specific conception of
dispensability. The present paper explores and critiques the reigning conception of dispensability. In particular, I argue that it entails that too many things are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This entailment is at odds with the purpose for which we seek a conception of dispensability. In light of my arguments, I present a positive proposal that radically shifts our understanding of how dispensability and indispensability arguments work. This new proposal demands a metaphysics of science that splits the difference between pure empiricism and pure rationalism.

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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Keywords: indispensability, dispensability, mathematics, metaphysics
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Depositing User: Mr. Alex LeBrun
Date Deposited: 31 May 2022 02:29
Last Modified: 31 May 2022 02:29
Item ID: 20685
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Date: 2022

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