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On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements

Popa, Eugen (2022) On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘hinge commitments.’ I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal (‘shallow’) can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Popa, Eugeno.popa@utwente.nl0000-0002-8214-8986
Keywords: Deep disagreements; Argumentation; Rational resolution; Joint Experience of Facts; Fundamental Epistemic Principles
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Rhetoric of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: dr. Eugen Popa
Date Deposited: 28 May 2022 14:56
Last Modified: 28 May 2022 14:56
Item ID: 20672
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Rhetoric of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20672

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