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Why Kinship is Progeneratively Constrained: Extending Anthropology

Wilson, Robert A. (2021) Why Kinship is Progeneratively Constrained: Extending Anthropology. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The conceptualisation of kinship and its study remain contested within anthropology. This paper draws on recent cognitive science, developmental cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of science to offer a novel argument for a view of kinship as progeneratively or reproductively constrained. I shall argue that kinship involves a form of extended cognition that incorporates progenerative facts, going on to show how the resulting articulation of kinship’s progenerative nature can be readily expressed by an influential conception of kinds, the homeostatic property cluster view. Identifying the distinctive role that our extended cognitive access to progenerative facts plays in kinship delivers an integrative, progenerativist view that avoids standard performativist criticisms of progenerativism as being ethnocentric, epistemically naïve, and reductive.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Wilson, Robert A.rwilson.robert@gmail.com0000-0002-8034-0317
Keywords: kinship performativism progenerativism extended cognition reductionism reproduction Malagasy ethnography natural kinds
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Anthropology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Professor Rob Wilson
Date Deposited: 04 Jan 2022 04:37
Last Modified: 04 Jan 2022 04:37
Item ID: 20072
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Anthropology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 26 November 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20072

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