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Argument-Forms Which Turn Invalid Over Infinite Domains: Physicalism as Supertask?

Legg, Catherine (2008) Argument-Forms Which Turn Invalid Over Infinite Domains: Physicalism as Supertask? Contemporary Pragmatism, 5 (1). pp. 1-11. ISSN 9042024852

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Abstract

Argument-forms exist which are valid over finite but not infinite domains. Despite understanding of this by formal logicians, philosophers can be observed treating as valid arguments which are in fact invalid over infinite domains. In support of this claim I will first present an argument against the classical pragmatist theory of truth by Mark Johnston. Then, more ambitiously, I will suggest the fallacy lurks in certain arguments for physicalism taken for granted by many
philosophers today.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Legg, Catherinec.legg@deakin.edu.au0000-0002-0231-5415
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Dr Catherine Legg
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2021 23:40
Last Modified: 31 Oct 2021 23:40
Item ID: 19769
Journal or Publication Title: Contemporary Pragmatism
Publisher: Rodopi
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: June 2008
Page Range: pp. 1-11
Volume: 5
Number: 1
ISSN: 9042024852
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19769

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