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Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem: Insights from Philosophy of Science

Vervoort, Louis and Shevchenko, Alexander (2020) Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem: Insights from Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vervoort, Louisl.vervoort@utmn.ru
Shevchenko, Alexanderxyznsk@gmail.com
Additional Information: Accepted for publication in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (2021)
Keywords: Gettier problem; contextualism; perspectivism; Zagzebski
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Louis Vervoort
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2021 17:41
Last Modified: 19 Oct 2021 17:41
Item ID: 19677
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 9 November 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19677

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