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The Debates on Scientific Realism

Ruyant, Quentin (2021) The Debates on Scientific Realism. Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism. pp. 1-12.

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Abstract

This is the first chapter of Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism. The debate on scientific realism results from a tension between the empiricist methodology, which is a defining feature of science, and claims to the effect that science can unveil the fundamental nature of reality. What distinguishes realist and anti-realist positions is not necessarily that the former take scientific knowledge “at face value” or take the side of scientists in general while the latter do not. Rather, realists and anti-realists propose different ways of interpreting science as a whole, and in particular its aim (axiological realism), its possible achievements (epistemic
realism) and its content (semantic realism). The aim of this book is to defend an interpretation that potentially applies to each of these three levels: modal empiricism. This position purports to be the articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science. This introductory chapter briefly presents the position, then outlines the structure of the book.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ruyant, Quentinquentin.ruyant@gmail.com
Keywords: Scientific realism Empiricism Pragmatism Natural modalities
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Mr. Quentin Ruyant
Date Deposited: 27 Sep 2021 01:56
Last Modified: 27 Sep 2021 01:56
Item ID: 19614
Journal or Publication Title: Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism
Publisher: Springer Nature
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-03...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72349-1_1
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: June 2021
Page Range: pp. 1-12
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19614

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