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Approximate Coherentism and Luck

Babic, Boris (2020) Approximate Coherentism and Luck. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent credences. This norm is intended as a generalization of ordinary coherence. I argue that it may be unable to play this role by considering its application under learning experiences. While it is unclear how imperfect agents should revise their beliefs, I suggest a plausible route is through Bayesian updating. However, Bayesian updating can take an incoherent agent from relatively more coherent credences to relatively less coherent credences, depending on the data observed. Thus, comparative rationality judgments among incoherent agents are unduly sensitive to luck.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Babic, Boris0000000328001307
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Boris Babic
Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2021 04:53
Last Modified: 12 Mar 2021 04:53
Item ID: 18793
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/713905
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1086/713905
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18793

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