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Degrees of Epistemic Opacity

San Pedro, Iñaki (2020) Degrees of Epistemic Opacity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The paper analyses in some depth the distinction by Paul Humphreys between "epistemic opacity" —which I refer to as "weak epistemic opacity" here— and "essential epistemic opacity", and defends the idea that epistemic opacity in general can be made sense as coming in degrees. The idea of degrees of epistemic opacity is then exploited to show, in the context of computer simulations, the tight relation between the concept of epistemic opacity and actual scientific (modelling and simulation) practices. As a consequence, interesting questions arise in connection with the role of agents dealing with epistemically opaque processes such as computer simulations.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
San Pedro, Iñakii.sanpedro@icloud.com0000-0001-6280-2568
Keywords: Computer simulations; Epistemic opacity
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
General Issues > Computer Simulation
Depositing User: Dr Iñaki San Pedro
Date Deposited: 18 Dec 2020 05:04
Last Modified: 18 Dec 2020 05:04
Item ID: 18525
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
General Issues > Computer Simulation
Date: 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18525

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