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Psychoneural Isomorphism: From Metaphysics to robustness

Vernazzani, Alfredo (2020) Psychoneural Isomorphism: From Metaphysics to robustness. [Preprint]

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Abstract

At the beginning of the 20th century, Gestalt psychologists put forward
the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, which was meant to replace Fechner’s
obscure notion of psychophysical parallelism and provide a heuristics that may facilitate the search for the neural correlates of the mind. However, the concept has generated much confusion in the debate, and today its role is still unclear. In this contribution, I will attempt a little conceptual spadework in clarifying the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, focusing exclusively on conscious visual perceptual experience and its neural correlates. Firstly, I will outline the history of our concept, and its alleged metaphysical and epistemic roles. Then, I will clarify the nature of isomorphism and rule out its metaphysical role. Finally, I will review some epistemic roles of our concept, zooming in on the work of Jean Petitot, and suggest that it does not play a relevant heuristic role. I conclude suggesting that psychoneural isomorphism might be an indicator of robustness for certain mathematical descriptions of perceptual content.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vernazzani, Alfredo
Keywords: Philosophy of cognitive science; Psychoneural Isomorphism; History of psychology; Mind-Body problem; Mathematical models; Gestalt psychology.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Dr. Alfredo Vernazzani
Date Deposited: 07 Dec 2020 15:57
Last Modified: 07 Dec 2020 15:57
Item ID: 18491
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_13
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18491

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