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What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, hypotheses, and “kinding in progress”

Colaço, David (2020) What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, hypotheses, and “kinding in progress”. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper accounts for broad definitions of memory, which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don’t count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis. As opposed to construing definitions as expressing memory’s properties, a definition as a hypothesis is the basis to test inferences about phenomena. A definition as a hypothesis is valuable when the “kinding” of phenomena is on-going.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Colaço, David
Keywords: natural kinds; memory; definitions; scientific phenomena; hypotheses
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Depositing User: Dr. David Colaço
Date Deposited: 24 Nov 2020 23:49
Last Modified: 24 Nov 2020 23:49
Item ID: 18415
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Date: 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18415

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