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Constitutive Elements Through Perspectival Lenses

Sanjuán, Mariano (2020) Constitutive Elements Through Perspectival Lenses. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Recent debates in philosophy of science have witnessed the rise of two major proposals. On the one hand, regarding the conceptual structure of scientific theories, some believe that they exhibit constitutive elements. The constitutive elements of a theory are the components that play the role of laying the foundations of empirical meaningfulness, and whose acceptance is prior to empirical research. On the other hand, as for the nature of scientific knowledge and its relation to nature, perspectival realism has pursued a middle ground in classic debates between realism and antirealism, by assuming that although knowledge is always situated both historically and culturally, scientific statements have truth values and constitute genuine claims about a mind-independent world. In this paper, I argue that these two lines of research are not only compatible but complement each other, and provide a common view of science. I contend that a theoretical perspective is a set of constitutive elements where models and representations may develop, and stress that both constitutivism and perspectivism have numerous shared characteristics, such as their vindication of the historicity of scientific knowledge, their recognition of human epistemic limits, and a very similar conception of truth


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sanjuán, Marianomariano.sanjuan@uam.es0000-0003-1849-4769
Keywords: Perspectivism; Perspectival Realism; Relative A Priori; Michael Friedman; Ronald Giere; Michela Massimi
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Mr. Mariano Sanjuán
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2020 15:01
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2020 15:01
Item ID: 18408
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: November 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18408

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