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The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko's hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction.

Hirèche, Salim and Linnemann, Niels and Michels, Robert and Vogt, Lisa (2020) The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko's hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In a recent paper, Tuomas Tahko has argued for a hybrid view of the laws of nature, according to which some physical laws are metaphysically necessary, while others are metaphysically contingent.
In this paper, we show that his criterion for distinguishing between these two kinds of laws --- which crucially relies on the essences of natural kinds --- is on its own unsatisfactory. We then propose an alternative way of drawing the metaphysically necessary/contingent distinction for laws of physics based on the central kinematical/dynamical distinction used in physical theorising, and argue that the criterion can be used to amend Tahko's own account, but also that it can be combined with different metaphysical views about the source of necessity.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hirèche, Salim
Linnemann, Niels
Michels, Robert
Vogt, Lisa
Keywords: hybrid laws modality laws of nature laws of physics metaphysical necessity kinematical/dynamical distinction
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Depositing User: Niels Linnemann
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2020 05:04
Last Modified: 11 Nov 2020 05:04
Item ID: 18371
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Date: 6 November 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18371

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