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Epistemic Objectivity and the Virtues

Sankey, Howard (2020) Epistemic Objectivity and the Virtues. Filozofia Nauki, 28 (3). pp. 5-23.

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The aim of this paper is to bring the resources of virtue epistemology to bear on the issue of the epistemic objectivity of science. A distinction is made between theoretical virtues that may be possessed by scientific theories and epistemic virtues that may be exercised by individual scientists. A distinction is then made between ontological objectivity, objectivity of truth and epistemic objectivity, the latter being the principal focus of the paper. It is then noted that a role must be played by deliberative judgement in determining how to apply the theoretical virtues. It is suggested that such judgement may be virtuous in light of the exercise of the epistemic virtues. It is argued that the primary location of epistemic objectivity is the theoretical virtues, whereas the epistemic virtues of scientists play a subordinate role.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Keywords: objectivity; theoretical virtue; epistemic virtue; virtue epistemology
Depositing User: Howard Sankey
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2020 15:11
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2020 15:11
Item ID: 18354
Journal or Publication Title: Filozofia Nauki
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle:
Date: 2020
Page Range: pp. 5-23
Volume: 28
Number: 3

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