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Can Multiple Realisation be Explained?

Franklin, Alexander (2020) Can Multiple Realisation be Explained? Philosophy (Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy). ISSN 0031-8191

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Abstract

Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example – the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections: contra (e.g.) Polger and Shapiro (2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (1999), I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be reductively explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory strategy.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Franklin, Alexanderalexander.r.franklin@kcl.ac.uk0000-0001-6034-4575
Keywords: Multiple Realisation Multiple Realisability Multiple Realization Multiple Realizability Explanation Reduction
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Condensed Matter
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Dr Alexander Franklin
Date Deposited: 14 Sep 2020 14:34
Last Modified: 14 Sep 2020 14:34
Item ID: 18080
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy (Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy)
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Official URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819120000285
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Condensed Matter
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 14 September 2020
ISSN: 0031-8191
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18080

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