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Referential and Perspectival Realism

Teller, Paul (2018) Referential and Perspectival Realism. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 9 (1). pp. 151-164. ISSN 1913-0465

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Abstract

Ronald Giere (2006) has argued that at its best science gives us knowledge only from different “perspectives,” but that this knowledge still counts as scientific realism. Others have noted that his “perspectival realism” is in tension with scientific realism as traditionally understood: How can different, even conflicting, perspectives give us what there is really? This essay outlines a program (some published, much forthcoming) that makes good on Giere’s idea with a fresh understanding of “realism” that eases this tension.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Teller, Paul
Keywords: Scientific Realism; Epistemic Issues; Epistemology of Science
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Jordan Miller
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2021 13:02
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2021 13:02
Item ID: 17836
Journal or Publication Title: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science
Publisher: The University of Toronto
Official URL: https://spontaneousgenerations.library.utoronto.ca...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26990
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 15 February 2018
Page Range: pp. 151-164
Volume: 9
Number: 1
ISSN: 1913-0465
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17836

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