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Sensitivity and Closure

Roush, Sherrilyn (2012) Sensitivity and Closure. The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. pp. 242-268.

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Abstract

This paper argues that if knowledge is defined in terms of probabilistic tracking then the benefits of epistemic closure follow without the addition of a closure clause. (This updates my definition of knowledge in Tracking Truth 2005.) An important condition on this result is found in "Closure Failure and Scientific Inquiry" (2017).


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Roush, Sherrilynsherri.roush@gmail.com
Keywords: growth of error, epistemic closure, knowledge, induction, sensitivity
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Sherrilyn Roush
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2020 03:12
Last Modified: 03 Jul 2020 03:12
Item ID: 17426
Journal or Publication Title: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511783630
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511783630
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date: 2012
Page Range: pp. 242-268
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17426

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