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Causal Pluralism in Philosophy: Empirical Challenges and Alternative Proposals

Dinh, Phuong (Phoebe) and Danks, David (2020) Causal Pluralism in Philosophy: Empirical Challenges and Alternative Proposals. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological data. Different aspects of causal cognition-specifically, causal perception and causal inference-are thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they thereby distinctively support transference and dependency theories of causation, respectively. We argue that this dualistic picture of causal concepts arises from methodological differences, rather than from an actual plurality of concepts. Hence, philosophical causal pluralism is not particularly supported by the empirical data. Serious engagement with cognitive science reveals that the connection between psychological concepts of causation and philosophical notions is substantially more complicated than is traditionally presumed.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dinh, Phuong (Phoebe)pdinh@andrew.cmu.edu0000-0001-5470-4976
Danks, Davidddanks@cmu.edu0000-0003-4541-5966
Keywords: Causal pluralism, Cognitive science, Causal perception, Causal inference, Metaphysics
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Depositing User: Phuong (Phoebe) Dinh
Date Deposited: 09 Jun 2020 02:26
Last Modified: 09 Jun 2020 02:26
Item ID: 17294
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Date: 6 March 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17294

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