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Causal Exclusion without Causal Sufficiency

Vaassen, Bram (2020) Causal Exclusion without Causal Sufficiency. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Some non-reductionists claim that so-called ‘exclusion arguments’ against their position rely on a notion of causal sufficiency that is particularly problematic. I argue that such concerns about the role of causal sufficiency in exclusion arguments are relatively superficial since exclusionists can address
them by reformulating exclusion arguments in terms of physical sufficiency. The resulting exclusion arguments still face familiar problems, but these are not related to the choice between causal sufficiency and physical sufficiency. The upshot is that objections to the notion of causal sufficiency can be answered in a straightforward fashion and that such objections therefore do not pose a serious threat to exclusion arguments.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vaassen, Bramvaassenbram@gmail.com0000-0001-6423-1324
Keywords: Exclusion Argument; Causal Exclusion; Causal Sufficiency; Non-reductionism; Causation; Philosophy of Mind; Mental Causation; Reductionism
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Depositing User: Dr. Bram Vaassen
Date Deposited: 28 May 2020 03:07
Last Modified: 28 May 2020 03:07
Item ID: 17246
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Date: May 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17246

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