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Perception as a propositional attitude

Kalpokas, Daniel (2020) Perception as a propositional attitude. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (2). pp. 155-174. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, "Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?" (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of "the propositional-attitude thesis", it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane's arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Kalpokas, Danieldkalpokas@gmail.com
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Crane; propositional-attitude thesis; perceptual experience; propositional content; non-propositional content; accuracy conditions.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 26 May 2020 03:25
Last Modified: 26 May 2020 03:25
Item ID: 17207
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20574
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Date: May 2020
Page Range: pp. 155-174
Volume: 35
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17207

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