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Surrealism Is Not an Alternative to Scientific Realism

Park, Seungbae (2019) Surrealism Is Not an Alternative to Scientific Realism.

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Abstract

Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
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Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Empirical Adequacy, Observables, Scientific Realism, Surrealism, Truth
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 11 May 2020 03:09
Last Modified: 11 May 2020 03:09
Item ID: 17168
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17168

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