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A Bayesian account of establishing

Williamson, Jon (2020) A Bayesian account of establishing. [Preprint]

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Abstract

When a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other propositions. Can the Bayesian theory of rational belief and action provide an account of establishing? I argue that it can, but only if the Bayesian is willing to endorse objective constraints on both probabilities and utilities, and willing to deny that it is rationally permissible to defer wholesale to expert opinion. I develop a new account of deference that accommodates this latter requirement.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Williamson, Jonj.williamson@kent.ac.uk
Additional Information: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Keywords: Bayesianims; Evidence; Deference; Establishing
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Prof Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 20 Apr 2020 22:09
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2020 22:09
Item ID: 17093
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 20 April 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17093

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