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Self-Assembling Games and the Evolution of Salience

Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2020) Self-Assembling Games and the Evolution of Salience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1464-3537

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Abstract

We consider here how a generalized signaling game may self-assemble as the saliences of the agents evolve by reinforcement on those sources of information that in fact lead to successful action. On the present account, generalized signaling games self-assemble even as the agents coevolve meaningful representations and successful dispositions for using those representations. We will see how reinforcement on successful information sources also provides a mechanism whereby simpler games might compose to form more complex games. Along the way, we consider how an old game might be appropriated to a new context by reinforcement on successful associations between old and new saliences.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Barrett, Jeffrey A.j.barrett@uci.edu
Keywords: evolution of salience, self-assembling games, evolutionary game theory, evolution of perceptual categories
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Depositing User: Jeffrey Barrett
Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2020 03:29
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2020 03:29
Item ID: 17039
Journal or Publication Title: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Date: 31 March 2020
ISSN: 1464-3537
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17039

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